Abstract. "untraceability" is an important property of Proxy blind signature from bilinear pairings. In order to enhance the security of Nong et al.'s schemes, Zhang presented some new untraceable blind signatures. However, this paper indicates there are three important conclusions:1. We prove that the cryptanalysis method proposed by Zhang is not proper and Nong et al's scheme satisfies untraceability; 2. We proposes a new analysis method of untraceability which has proved that Nong et al.'s scheme is untraceable. Moreover, the method can also analyze other blind signature schemes 3.The efficiency of Nong et al.'s scheme is higher than the improved scheme of Zhang.
Introduction
Blind signature is a particular digital signature which needs to satisfy two additional properties: 1) Blindness: the signer does not see the content of the message. 2) Untraceability: the signer is unable to link the message-signature pair with the corresponding view after the blind signature has been revealed to the public by the requester.
Proxy signature scheme is also a particular digital signature which enables a proxy signer to sign message on behalf of an original signer. Recently, many proxy blind signatures have been proposed. A proxy blind signature is a digital signature scheme which combines the properties of proxy signature and blind signature schemes. Moreover, it gets some new properties. So it is very important in some special applications.
In 2010, Chen et al. [3] pointed out Lee et al.'s proxy blind signature was wrong. In 2009, Zhang [5] showed Nong et al.'scheme [4] couldn't satisfy the property of untraceability and proposed two corresponding improved schemes. Unfortunately, In this manuscript, we point out that Zhang's analysis method is improper and acquire three important conclusions.
Nong et al.'s Scheme and Security Analysis

Nong et al.'s Scheme
Here, we will briefly recall Nong et al.'s scheme [4] .
[Setup]: Let 1 G , 2 G be additive cyclic group and multiplicative cyclic group respectively with prime order q . A bilinear pairing 2 1 1 : 
, and then sends ) , , ,
to the receiver R.
2) R picks 
Then the proxy signer can trace the blind signature by checking
. If the checking equation holds, the scheme will satisfy the property of untraceability. Otherwise, it will not meet the property.
Our Discussion
In this section, we will prove Zhang's cryptanalysis is unfortunately incorrect. Because whenever the 
The proxy signer computes factors 3 { ,c } kP from equation (4) and (5), where
Then, by use of equation (1) and (2),we can see that the equation (3)always holds: Result II: The analysis and proof process in above can be used as a new method which can analyze the property of "untraceability" of other schemes related with blind signature. This method is called as "untraceability analysis method", which could be described generally as follows:
In one blind signature scheme  , for the revealed message-signature pair S and any view V stored, whether they are corresponding or not. Let the number of their corresponding "blindness" equations is n, firstly the signer obtains n-1 parameters through n-1 "blindness" equations, and then verify whether the nth "blindness" equations holds or not by substituting the n-1 parameters and known relations in signature scheme  into the nth "blindness" equations. If it holds, the blind signature scheme is untraceable. Otherwise, it does not satisfy the "untraceability".
Result III: The equations 
Conclusion
In this manuscript, we point out that Zhang's cryptanalysis method of untraceability is improper. Furthermore, we present a new analysis method of untraceability which can be used to analyze other schemes related with blind signature, such as [1] [2]. Xiao-chuan AI is also the corresponding author.
